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ABSTRACT
In this paper we develop a measure of competition based on management’s
disclosures in their 10-K filing and find that firms’ rates of diminishing
marginal returns on new and existing investment vary significantly with our
measure. We show that these firm-level disclosures are related to existing
industry-level measures of disclosure (e.g., Herfindahl index), but capture
something distinctly new. In particular, we show that the measure has both
across-industry variation and within-industry variation, and each is related to
the firm’s future rates of diminishing marginal returns. As such, our measure
is a useful complement to existing measures of competition. We present a bat-
tery of specification tests designed to explore the boundaries of our measure
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and how it varies with the definition of industry and the presence of other
measures of competition.
1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate the usefulness of management’s discussion
of competition in the 10-K. Financial statement analysis textbooks com-
monly recommend starting the evaluation process by considering the firm’s
competitive environment and its strategy for operating in its environment
(Healy and Palepu [2007], Lundholm and Sloan [2007], Penman [2009]).
Further, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recommends that
the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of the firm’s 10-K
filing include a discussion of the firm’s competitive position (Exchange Act
Release No 34–48960). However, the SEC has recently expressed concern
that many companies provide only boilerplate disclosures in the MD&A
(Pozen [2008]).1 This raises the question: is there information about the
firm’s competitive environment that can be gleaned directly from the firm’s
own disclosures? We develop a measure of competition based on statements
made in the firm’s 10-K and show how this new measure is related to future
operating performance in ways that suggest it is a valid measure of compe-
tition. Further, we show that our construct captures variation in competi-
tion between firms in the same industry, as well as variation in competition
across industries, and that both components are useful complements to ex-
isting measures of competition.
How managers perceive the firm’s competitive environment can signifi-
cantly influence their operating and investing decisions. For example, how
they price their products depends on how they perceive the threat of sub-
stitutes from existing rivals or the threat of new entrants into their markets.
How rapidly they invest in assets depends on whether they believe there are
many or few rivals, and how contestable the investments are by those rivals.
Furthermore, the realized level of competition has an obvious impact on
the subsequent payoffs to these operating and investing decisions. A simple
model that incorporates these ideas relates a firm’s competitive environ-
ment to the rate of diminishing marginal returns on existing assets and on
new investments. Economists have long held that competition causes these
returns to mean revert. Stigler [1963, p. 54] states that, “There is no more
important proposition in economic theory than that, under competition,
the rate of return on investment tends toward equality in all industries. En-
trepreneurs will seek to leave relatively unprofitable industries and enter
relatively profitable industries.” For this reason, our primary validity test
1 Brown and Tucker [2011] investigate the extent of boilerplate discussion by comparing
the annual changes in the MD&A to economic changes in the firm. They find that changes to
the MD&A are positively associated with both economic changes in the firm and the magni-
tude of stock price reactions to MD&A filings.
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for measuring competition is how well the variable conditions the rates of
diminishing marginal returns on new and existing assets.
We find that a firm’s return on net operating assets (RNOA)mean reverts
more severely, and that returns on new investment in net operating assets
(NOA) diminish faster, when management makes more references to com-
petition in the 10-K. We show that these results are robust to different ways
to construct our measure, including within matched size portfolios, and
persist after controlling for a host of other competition measures. Further,
the economic significance of the results is impressive. The coefficient of
mean reversion on RNOA is –0.192 for the lowest decile of our competition
measure but –0.278 for the highest decile of our measure. After controlling
for the mean reversion effect, the rate of diminishing returns on new NOA
is –0.086 for the lowest decile of our competition measure and –0.144 for
the highest decile of our measure.
Our measure of a firm’s competitive environment is surprisingly simple:
we count the number of references to competition in the firm’s 10-K filing,
being careful to remove phrases such as “less competitive,” and then scale
by the total number of words in the document. Our intent is to capture the
broadest notion of competition—the basic idea that more intense behav-
ior from new and existing rivals diminishes a firm’s ability to earn profits.
Although many of the references to competition in the 10-K might be boil-
erplate, we find a surprising amount of variation in our measure. The first
quartile value is 0.23 competition words per thousand 10-K words and the
third quartile is 0.78 words per thousand. We provide anecdotes that illus-
trate how the word “competition” is used in discussions about product mar-
ket competition, competition for labor and other inputs, and competition
for investment opportunities.
We conduct a battery of specification checks to rule out various omitted-
correlated variables. We find that our variable is significantly correlated
with many other measures of competition found in the literature, but none
of the correlations are particularly large. For instance, the Spearman cor-
relation between our measure and the Herfindahl index is only 0.081. We
also show that our competition measure is not proxying for the firm’s cur-
rent year performance, as might be the case if management blames poor
performance on competition. We find that our measure is significant when
constructed within size quintiles, so it is not proxying for a firm size ef-
fect, and is significant when alternative scaling variables are used. Finally,
although the measure is very persistent through time, we find that its ability
to condition the rate of diminishing marginal returns increases as we aver-
age it over more prior years, suggesting that we are eliminating noise in the
measure and capturing a true level of persistent competition.
In microeconomics and particularly in industrial organization, compe-
tition is typically construed as an industry-level concept. Therefore, as-
sessing the level of competition in an industry requires both a definition
of industry boundaries and a measure of the competition taking place
within those boundaries. By constructing a measure of competition from
402 F. LI, R. LUNDHOLM, AND M. MINNIS
management disclosures, we allow both the industry boundary and the
measure of competition to be determined endogenously by managers’ per-
ceptions. Besides sidestepping the issue of an industry definition, this ap-
proach has the advantage of capturing competition from many different
sources that are hard to identify empirically, such as competition from pri-
vate firms, foreign firms, and potential new entrants.
Although our measure does not require an industry definition, we
also show that it can be combined with existing industry classification
schemes to create an industry-level measure of competition. We find that
this industry-average competition measure performs better than the firm-
specific measure, and that the improvement increases with refinements in
the definition of industry.2 At the extreme, when we define a firm’s indus-
try as the collection of firms with similar product descriptions in their 10-K
(as given in Hoberg and Phillips [2011]), the difference in the coefficient
of mean reversion in RNOA between the lowest and highest deciles of our
refined industry competition measure are approximately double the differ-
ences for the firm-specific measure. The fact that our measure works best
when combined with the Hoberg-Phillips industry definitions suggests that
it is a useful measure of competition within product markets. More gener-
ally, for a variety of industry definitions, our measure has both a significant
across-industry component and a significant within-industry component,
and both are related to future rates of diminishing returns.
An extensive literature in accounting establishes that a firm’s disclosures
can be influenced by concerns for what a rival firm may learn from the
disclosure.3 For most of our tests we take management’s disclosures at face
value and find that this results in a robust measure of competition. How-
ever, we also find some indirect evidence of strategic distortions. We posit
that management is most likely to alter its disclosures away from an un-
biased assessment when the threat of potential entrants is high and there
are few existing rivals. Consistent with this, we find that our measure com-
plements existing measures of competition the most in exactly the places
where one might expect management to have the clearest insight and the
least incentives to distort the disclosures: in industries with a high level of
existing rivalry and a low threat of new entry, and in industries with very
similar products.
In the next section we discuss our new measure of competition in more
detail and develop our hypotheses in the context of the existing literature.
We present the results from our tests in section 3 and conclude in section 4.
2 One possible explanation of our empirical findings is that our competition measure does
not really capture competition; rather, it captures managers blaming competition for their
firms’ poor performance. To the extent that management’s incentives to attribute poor per-
formance to competition are firm specific, the fact that the industry-average of our measure
leads to stronger results suggests that our empirical findings are not driven by this alternative
explanation.
3 For example, Wagenhofer [1990], Hayes and Lundholm [1996], Harris [1998], Leuz
[2004], Berger and Hann [2007] is only a partial list of this literature.
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2. Measures and Hypotheses
2.1 WHAT IS COMPETITION AND HOW DO WE MEASURE IT?
We present a new measure of competition based on textual analysis of a
firm’s 10-K filing. However, before discussing the construction of the mea-
sure, it is useful to consider what we could hope to capture with any mea-
sure of competition.
How competition affects firm performance is a central question in busi-
ness and economics. Porter [1979] famously identifies five sources of com-
petitive intensity in an industry that determine a firm’s performance (bar-
riers to entry, threat of substitutes, competitive rivalry, bargaining power of
customers, and bargaining power of suppliers). Alternatively, a resource-
based view of competition emphasizes limiting imitation from rivals by de-
veloping unique and rare resources (Barney [1986]). Consistent with this
view, Brown and Kimbrough [2011] find that the degree to which a firm’s
earnings co-vary with industry earnings is negatively related to the firm’s
level of identifiable intangible assets (e.g., patents, copyrights, legal con-
tracts). Another notion of competition, labeled “Red Queen” competition,
describes how firms respond to innovation by rival firms with innovations
of their own, resulting in a self-escalating system wherein performance is
initially enhanced through innovation but later reduced by the responsive
innovation of rivals (Barnett and McKendrick [2004]).4 One can imagine
that, in different firms and different contexts, management’s discussion
of its competitive environment might be in response to any of these con-
cepts. But, as Barnett and McKendrick note, “A defining characteristic of
competition is that one organization’s solution becomes its rivals’ problem”
(p. 540). It is this broad construct that we wish to measure with our textual
analysis of management’s statements in the 10-K.
A more formal definition of competition pertains to the cross-elasticity
of demand—competition is more intense if one firm’s products are more
ready substitutes for another firm’s products. Empirical research has had
some success in measuring product substitutability across various manu-
facturing industries (e.g., Syverson [2004a, b]). Particularly relevant to
our study, these studies show that product substitutability differences arise
within industries, caused by factors such as transportation costs and product
differentiation.
The industrial organization literature views competition as an industry-
wide construct where some industry factor, such as the concentration of
production or the degree of product market differentiation, determines
the industry’s degree of competition. This view requires a definition of the
4 The name “Red Queen” competition comes from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass
(Carroll [1960]). When Alice realizes that, although she is running as fast as she can, she
doesn’t seem to get anywhere, the RedQueen responds: “Here, you see, it takes all the running
you can do, to keep in the same place.”
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industry boundaries and a measure of competition within those bound-
aries. So, for instance, a researcher might define the industry boundaries
using the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and the
degree of competition using the Herfindahl index. Our measure is unique
in that it does not require a definition of industry boundaries, although we
show later that it can be used with industry groupings quite successfully.
Empirically, the most common measures of competition found in the
literature are concentration ratios, either the Herfindahl index or the four-
firm concentration ratio; both focus on the distribution of production
across firms within an industry. Concentrated industries, where the bulk
of production is done by a few firms, are thought to earn abnormal profits
because barriers to entry thwart new entrants and the existing firms can
more easily collude (i.e., there is little competitive rivalry).
Although industry concentration ratios have a rich history in economics,
they lack precision when it comes to detecting how an individual firm’s
operating and investing decisions, and the financial consequences of those
decisions, might be influenced by competition. Further, industry-based con-
centration measures are typically constructed using only the public firm
data available in Compustat. Ali, Klasa, and Yeung [2009] and Bens, Berger,
and Monahan [2011] find that failing to take private firms into account
results in poor proxies for the actual industry concentration. Consistent
with this, Dedman and Lennox [2009] survey private firm managers in
the United Kingdom and find no relation between the managers’ percep-
tions of their competitive environment and the industry concentration ra-
tio. This latter result may accord well with the results of Syverson [2004b] in
which he identified substantial competitive variation within a very specific
industry—ready-mixed concrete—as a result of spatial boundaries.
There are a variety of fixed industry definitions used in the literature,
ranging from the 48 industries in the Fama and French [1997] classification
to the more than 1,000 industries found in the SIC four-digit classification
system.5 These definitions are relatively fixed in time and identify mutually
exclusive sets of firms, and are thus subject to a number of criticisms. First,
mutually exclusive sets are sometimes crude ways to group companies. For
example, Apple competes with Microsoft in the software industry, Samsung
and Nokia in the mobile phone industry, Amazon in the online retailing
industry, and Google in both the hardware and software industries. More
broadly, Rauh and Sufi [2012] offer large-sample evidence showing that
SIC-code-based industry definitions bear little relation to the list of com-
petitors that firms disclose in their proxy statements.
In response to criticisms of traditional industry definitions, Hoberg and
Phillips [2011] construct a measure of product similarity based on textual
analysis of product descriptions in 10-K filings and then define industries as
5 Other industry classification systems exist as well, such as the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) and the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).
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sets of sufficiently similar firms. These industry boundaries can vary across
time and need not be mutually exclusive, with each firm having its own
unique set of competitors. They find that using these industry boundaries
more clearly defines where R&D or advertising expenditures create prod-
uct market differentiation.6 Although our primary analysis is on the firm-
specific version of our measure, which does not require an industry defi-
nition, we also show that combining our measure of competition with the
Hoberg-Phillips industry definition produces a very successful measure of
industry-level competition.
We measure management’s perceptions of the intensity of the compe-
tition they face using textual analysis of the firm’s 10-K filing. We count
the number of occurrences of “competition, competitor, competitive, com-
pete, competing,” including those words with an “s” appended, and then
remove any case where “not,” “less,” “few,” or “limited” precedes the word
by three or fewer words. To control for 10-K length, we scale the number
of competition-related words by the total number of words in the 10-K. The
resulting measure of competition is
PCTCOMP = NCOMP
NWORDS
,
where NCOMP and NWORDS are the net number of occurrences of com-
petition words and the total number of words in a 10-K, respectively. In
the empirical analysis, we use the variable COMP , which is the decile-
ranked value of PCTCOMP , computed each year, then scaled to be in [0,1].
In robustness checks, we also construct a within-size quintile version of
PCTCOMP ; report results using two different scalars, the firm’s total assets
and the firm’s number of segments; and present results using the historical
rolling average of COMP .
To illustrate the types of management statements our measure cap-
tures, appendix A gives six examples. The first example from Columbia
Sportswear offers a rather standard reference to existing rivals. The sec-
ond example from MHI Hospitality talks about how competition may limit
investment opportunities when investments are contestable. The third ex-
ample, also from Columbia Sportswear, refers to competition for inputs, in
this case for employees. The fourth example from Open Text Corp. sounds
exactly like “Red Queen” competition, describing a system of continual in-
novation in response to rivals’ innovations.7 The fifth example from First
National Energy Corp illustrates why we remove references to competition
6 This approach has also been successful in analyzing merger activity (Hoberg and Phillips
[2010]) and financing activity (Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala [2013]).
7 Open Text also illustrates why we use the whole 10-K filing rather than only the MD&A
section. In their 2008 filing there were 74 competition references (of 61,290 words): 19 in Item
1 Description of Business, 29 in Item 1A Risk Factors, 3 in Item 7MD&A, 1 in Item 10 Directors
and Officers, and 22 in Item 11 Executive Compensation. Further, because companies do not
use uniform descriptions of the required items in a 10-K filing, it would be difficult to design
an algorithm that would cleanly isolate each section.
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that are preceded by the words “no” or “limited.” Finally, comparing the
fifth example with the sixth example from Oil Dri Corp. illustrates the sub-
tlety of language and why no algorithm will be perfect. Oil Dri’s reference
to competition should count, and yet it will wrongly be eliminated because
it is preceded by “limited by.”8
Our approach is simple, parsimonious, and effective. It measures com-
petition at the firm level and can respond to management’s concern about
both private and public firms (unlike measures based on publicly available
data). To capture the notion of competition in a more structured way would
require much more detailed assumptions about the exact nature of compe-
tition, and the context and linguistic structure of the references to competi-
tion. However, more complicated methods in computational linguistics and
natural language processing literature often lead to minimum improve-
ment at significant costs (Berry [2004]). For instance, Turney [2002] uses
a simple unsupervised learning algorithm to classify customer reviews of
products on epinions.com into positive and negative categories and shows
that a parsimonious approach performs equally well compared to more
structured models.
Our measure assumes that managers have reasonably accurate percep-
tions of the relevant type of competition their firm faces and its “true”
level, and that what they report in their 10-K filing is a reasonably unbiased
representation of those perceptions. Absent an objective “true” measure of
competition, we cannot distinguish between “true” competition and man-
agement’s perceptions or disclosures about it.9 We do, however, offer some
indirect evidence that some strategic distortion might be present in the
disclosures about competition. We find that, at times when management
might have the greatest motive to distort their disclosures about competi-
tion, our measure is less effective. These results are weak and indirect, but
suggest that there might be a small amount of “strategic” distortion in our
measure.
We assess the construct validity of our measure by correlating it with
seven other measures of competition offered in Karuna [2007, 2010] and
Li [2010]. These papers examine how industry-level competition influ-
ences management’s voluntary disclosures about future operating activities
(e.g., management earnings forecasts, segment disclosures, research and
development expenditures, order backlog). In contrast, we measure how
8 As a practical matter, the part of the algorithm that eliminates competition references pre-
ceded by negative words has little impact on the results. An even simpler algorithm that counts
only references to “competition” and “competitor” and these words with an “s” appended pro-
duces results that are extremely close to those reported here.
9 Our approach of taking the 10-K disclosures at face value is consistent with other studies
using textual analysis, including Hoberg and Phillips [2011], Li [2007], and Loughran and
McDonald [2011]. Moreover, it is interesting to note that Johnston and Petacchi [2012] cat-
egorize a large sample of SEC comment letters and find that none of the SEC comments for
10-K filings relate to a firm’s discussion of its “Competitive Environment”—i.e., competition
discussion does not appear to be a significant disclosure issue per the SEC.
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management’s disclosures about competition reveal information about fu-
ture operating performance.
2.2 MANIFESTATIONS OF COMPETITION
To assess whether our measure based on management’s references to
competition in the 10-K is useful and valid, we examine how it conditions
the rate of mean reversion in returns on existing assets and the rate of
diminishing returns on new investments. There are a number of reasons
to expect competition to affect these two rates. Consider a firm with no
change to its asset base. Porter’s five forces give a laundry list of reasons
why firms with unusually high returns on existing assets will suffer declin-
ing returns as competition arrives to erode their competitive advantage.
Similarly, firms with unusually low returns on existing assets will benefit
from reduced competition as competitors leave their markets in search of
higher asset returns elsewhere.10
Mean reversion in accounting rates of return is documented by consider-
able prior accounting research. Nissim and Penman [2001] find that re-
turn on equity mean reverts to an economy-wide average (about 12%),
and Fairfield, Ramnath, and Yohn [2009] show that the return on equity
mean reverts to an economy-wide rate and not an industry rate. Fama and
French [2000] show that mean reversion is significant after controlling for
cross-sectional correlation. Stigler [1968] and Lev [1983] find evidence of
higher levels of earnings persistence in concentrated industries and indus-
tries with higher barriers to entry, respectively. Cheng [2005] finds that the
rate of mean reversion in abnormal return on equity is slower for larger
firms in concentrated industries with barriers to entry. Healy et al. [2011]
find that international variation in measures of competition predict inter-
national variation in the rate of mean reversion in return on equity.11 If our
measure is a valid measure of competition, it should condition the rate of
mean reversion in accounting returns. We hypothesize that:
H1: The coefficient of mean reversion in RNOA will become more nega-
tive as COMP increases.
Now consider how competition influences the return on new investments
or divestments (i.e., a changing asset base). Absent any competitive forces,
returns on investments typically diminish. For example, when growing,
Starbucks opens stores at the most profitable locations first so that subse-
quent investments are necessarily less profitable. Similarly, when shrinking,
10 See also Marx [1894] “The Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall,” Chapter 3 of Das
Kapital , Volume 3.
11 Dickinson and Sommers [2012] study a number of variables that are hypothesized to
proxy for “competitive effort,” including inventory turnover, the ratio of operating liabilities to
net operating assets, financial leverage, and net financial assets. They find that these variables
help to predict next year’s industry and risk-adjusted RNOA as main effects, but they find no
evidence that the variables condition the rate of mean reversion in returns.
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Starbucks closes the least profitable stores first so that the remaining assets
are necessarily more profitable.12 This intuition is formalized by Warusaw-
itharana [2008]. He presents a model where diminishing marginal returns
induce firms to invest or divest as their profitability changes. Effectively, the
firm is attempting to adjust its size until its return on assets equals its cost of
capital. Consistent with this, he finds that a firm’s return on assets is a sig-
nificant predictor of asset sales and purchases. We hypothesize that compe-
tition intensifies this effect, as it increases the rate of diminishing marginal
returns. Real option theory maintains that, in the face of uncertain payoffs,
a viable strategy is to wait and only invest when the expected return exceeds
some threshold higher than the cost of capital. Grenadier [2002] shows that
this threshold decreases in the presence of competition if rival firms can
take contestable investment opportunities away from the firm. Simply put,
Starbucks will have a lower threshold for investment when making store-
opening decisions if there is a possibility that Caribou Coffee will claim the
best locations while it waits. Empirically, Akdogu and McKay [2009] find
that firms in competitive industries make large investments sooner than
firms in monopolistic industries.
In accounting, diminishing marginal returns to changes in investment is
studied in Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn [2003], who estimate the relation
between future return on total assets (ROA), current ROA, and changes
in NOA. They find that the future ROA is significantly decreasing in the
changes in NOA after controlling for the current ROA. Richardson et al.
[2005] find a similar result by regressing future ROA on current ROA and
total accruals, where total accruals equals the change in NOA plus the
change in noncash net financial assets (i.e., noncash financial assets less
financial liabilities). They find that, after controlling for current ROA, fu-
ture ROA is significantly decreasing in total accruals.13 They then decom-
pose total accruals and find that the diminishing rates of return are driven
primarily by the changes in the NOA, as opposed to changes in the net
financial assets.14
If our measure is a valid measure of competition, it should condition the
rate of diminishing marginal return on investment. As a second test of our
construct’s validity, we hypothesize that:
H2: The coefficient of diminishing returns on NOA will become more
negative as COMP increases.
12 Smith [1776, p. 94] summarized this hypothesis with “It may be laid down as a maxim,
that wherever a great deal can be made by the use of money, a great deal will commonly be
given for the use of it; and that wherever little can be made by it, less will commonly be given
for it.”
13 Curtis and Lewis [2010] find that the negative relation between future ROA and changes
in NOA is due largely to firms with “old” assets.
14 A different branch of the literature further decomposes return on asset measures into
the profit margin times the asset turnover ratio, finding that changes in profit margin are
more transitory than changes in asset turnover. See Nissim and Penman [2001], Fairfield and
Yohn [2001], and Soliman [2008].
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In sum, our paper furthers the existing financial statement analysis liter-
ature by conditioning the relations between future RNOA, current RNOA,
and changes in NOA, on the level of competition, as measured by COMP .
If both relations are more negative when our measure of competition is
higher, this is consistent with COMP being a useful and valid measure of
competition at the firm level.
Like prior research, we do not offer a dynamic model of how competition
evolves over time. At any point in time a firm finds itself with some level of
competition and this level conditions how the firm’s return on new and
existing assets will evolve in the future. One might expect that, as these
returns change, so might the firm’s competitive landscape, but we do not
model or estimate this more complicated scenario. It is unlikely that “true”
competition changes much from year to year and, not surprisingly, we find
that COMP is quite persistent over time. We use this fact to create a slightly
more precise measure of the level of competition, as discussed in the next
section.
As with any cross-sectional model, it is tempting to ask how it would hold
up in a changes specification. Note, however, that competition is not a main
effect; it changes the rate that returns on new and existing assets diminish.
A changes specification would have to specify how changes in competition
produce changes in these rates. Further, because competition levels are
likely to be very persistent from year to year, large changes in COMP are
likely to be caused by noise, possibly because the firm underwent some
large transaction during the prior or current year that required an unusual
increase in the length of the 10-K to explain.15
3. Results
3.1 THE SAMPLE
We construct our sample based on the intersection of firm-years available
on the EDGAR filings database, where we get the textual data on references
to competition, and the Compustat annual file for years 1995–2009. Most
EDGAR filings are not available before 1995. We merge these databases
based on Compustat GVKEY and the SEC’s Central Index Key and elimi-
nate financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999).
We require that the firm have sufficient financial data to compute the
RNOA, ROA, the change in NOA, and the change in total assets. We also
eliminate firms with sales, NOA, or total assets that are less than zero, or
if their market value (MV ) is less than $1 million. Finally, consistent with
prior studies, we eliminate firms with extreme financial ratios. Specifically,
we eliminate firms with RNOA greater than 100% or less than –100%, and
eliminate firms with sales growth less than –100% or greater than 1,000%.
15 This notion is confirmed when we find that using COMP averaged over time produces
larger economic results as we discuss in section 3.4.
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The final sample is 33,492 firm-years. All variables are winsorized at the 1%
and 99% level.
3.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PCTCOMP
Summary statistics for PCTCOMP are given by industry in table 1. To
establish a benchmark, the grand mean of PCTCOMP is 0.583 words per
thousand words in the 10-K, shown at the bottom of the table. To put this
in some perspective, the sample-widemedian number of competition words
is 27 and the median number of total words is 59,870. Both have increased
steadily over our sample period. Table 1 is sorted by the average PCTCOMP
within each industry (as defined in Fama and French [1997]), with Elec-
tronic Equipment at the top with 0.780 competition words per thousand
and Precious Metals at the bottom with 0.174.16 Note that, although we
have rank ordered table 1 by Fama-French industries, this is only for broad
descriptive purposes; our measure does not require an industry definition.
Nonetheless, table 1 shows that there is substantial variation in PCTCOMP
both across and within industries. In fact, the within-industry variation is
typically about half the mean. Later we show that both sources of variation
add significantly to our model.
Table 1 also reports the Herfindahl index (HHI ) and the number of
firms in each industry. It is clear that PCTCOMP measures something quite
different from the Herfindahl index, even when it is averaged over all the
firms in the industry. PCTCOMP appears more closely related to the num-
ber of firms in the industry, although by no means perfectly so. We quantify
these relations in table 2.
Although PCTCOMP varies significantly across firms in the same industry,
it does not vary much for a single firm through time. Figure 1 plots COMP
(the deciled version of PCTCOMP) for the year before and year after the
sort. The figure shows some mean reversion in the tails, as almost any mea-
sure does when sorted, but in no case does the average value change by 2
deciles, and the relative order of the 10 deciles is maintained from the year
before through the year after the sort.
16 It is interesting to observe that several commodity industries (e.g., coal, petroleum, min-
ing, metals) have the lowest reported level of competition based on our measure. Given that
these firms compete in markets with relatively homogenous products, low levels of compe-
tition may seem anomalous. We suggest two possibilities: (1) As Hayek [1948, p. 95] and
others have noted, producing homogenous products is not a sufficient condition for perfect
competition—“free entry into the market” and “complete knowledge of the relevant factors
on the part of all participants in the market” are also essential elements. A distinct possibility,
then, is that these industries have substantial barriers to entry, in particular, which is reflected
in the relatively few firms that compete in these industries (with perhaps the exception of
petroleum). (2) At the other extreme possibility, competition in these commodity-based in-
dustries reflects perfect competition and competition is so obvious that mention of this fact in
the annual report is superfluous. The fact that both of these possibilities exist leads us to con-
duct robustness tests in which we exclude firms with extreme levels of competition discussion.
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TA B L E 1
Competition Measure by Fama-French Industry
Fama-French Industry Mean Median Std. Dev. HHI n
Electronic Equipment 0.780 0.692 0.408 0.16 211
Telecommunications 0.758 0.678 0.398 0.12 127
Computers 0.752 0.648 0.374 0.23 120
Measuring and Control Equip 0.724 0.652 0.375 0.21 86
Electrical Equipment 0.721 0.670 0.423 0.27 73
Medical Equipment 0.671 0.607 0.332 0.19 113
Alcoholic Beverages 0.660 0.606 0.278 0.27 8
Business Services 0.651 0.585 0.359 0.18 466
Recreational Products 0.634 0.557 0.373 0.35 33
Retail 0.623 0.563 0.334 0.29 85
Miscellaneous 0.614 0.530 0.287 0.24 15
Pharmaceutical Products 0.606 0.589 0.215 0.11 113
Wholesale 0.586 0.518 0.271 0.33 169
Textiles 0.573 0.507 0.277 0.41 9
Machinery 0.561 0.482 0.355 0.29 138
Steel Works, Etc. 0.544 0.492 0.252 0.26 65
Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq 0.539 0.425 0.344 0.22 6
Food Products 0.537 0.444 0.357 0.51 37
Rubber and Plastic Products 0.535 0.505 0.307 0.32 29
Automobiles and Trucks 0.523 0.481 0.295 0.21 59
Construction Materials 0.521 0.494 0.214 0.35 61
Business Supplies 0.520 0.446 0.284 0.29 43
Printing and Publishing 0.518 0.553 0.207 0.22 28
Healthcare 0.505 0.432 0.257 0.29 85
Consumer Goods 0.502 0.431 0.247 0.33 56
Entertainment 0.501 0.411 0.272 0.24 61
Construction 0.497 0.431 0.302 0.24 55
Aircraft 0.496 0.407 0.214 0.26 12
Apparel 0.493 0.478 0.215 0.48 34
Defense 0.477 0.451 0.214 0.37 11
Candy and Soda 0.476 0.478 0.173 0.52 10
Personal Services 0.470 0.437 0.287 0.43 40
Transportation 0.467 0.443 0.231 0.19 122
Fabricated Products 0.460 0.420 0.237 0.40 14
Chemicals 0.453 0.427 0.215 0.27 76
Utilities 0.449 0.373 0.291 0.14 147
Restaurants, Hotel, Motel 0.403 0.368 0.223 0.15 35
Agriculture 0.396 0.408 0.109 0.74 8
Shipping Containers 0.395 0.492 0.183 0.37 7
Coal 0.349 0.265 0.265 0.20 7
Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.336 0.297 0.199 0.09 180
Nonmetallic Mines 0.307 0.293 0.191 0.40 10
Precious Metals 0.174 0.144 0.171 0.18 11
Total 0.583 0.513 0.337 0.23 3,060
This table presents the industry mean, median, and standard deviation for PCTCOMP . To calculate
the industry mean, the mean of PCTCOMP is calculated for each firm with at least five years of data and
the industry statistics are calculated from the firm means for each industry with at least five firms. HHI is
the average Herfindahl index over the time period and n is the number of firms in the industry with a
minimum of five years of data.
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FIG. 1.—Persistence of Competition Disclosure. The average decile is plotted for years t – 1, t,
and t + 1 for deciles of PCTCOMP created in year t.
As our first evidence that COMP is picking up the broadly defined con-
struct “competition,” in table 2 we relate it to the seven other measures of
competition offered in Li [2010], and with the Hoberg-Phillips measure of
firm similarity (SIM).17 Li’s measures are (1) the weighted average of prop-
erty, plant, and equipment in the industry (IND-PPE); (2) the weighted
average of research and development in the industry (IND-R&D); (3) the
weighted average of capital expenditures in the industry (IND-CPX ). For
these three weighted average measures, each firm’s amount is weighted by
the ratio of its segment sales to industry aggregate sales, creating a “repre-
sentative firm” measure for each industry. The other measures are (4) the
product market size (IND-MKTS), measured as the natural log of industry
aggregate sales; (5) the four-firm concentration ratio (IND-CON4), mea-
sured as the sum of market shares of the four largest firms in an industry;
(6) the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (IND-HHI ), measured as the sum of
squared market shares of all firms in an industry; and (7) the total number
of firms in the industry (IND-NUM). The first four measures are commonly
considered to measure competition from new rivals, and measures five to
17 See the discussion in Li [2010] for references to the accounting and economics literature
that originally proposed each of these measures, and for precise definitions of the computa-
tions of the measures. We do not tabulate two of Li’s measures because they are not clearly
measures of exiting rivalry or potential entrants (industry ROA and industry profit margin).
Industry ROA is not significantly related to our measure and industry profit margin is weakly
related, with a Spearman correlation of –0.088. See Hoberg and Phillips [2011] for a complete
description of their measure.
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seven are considered measures of competition from existing rivals. Other
than IND-NUM , all constructs are predicted to be decreasing as competi-
tion increases. Note also that, consistent with the industrial organization
view of competition, all seven measures are defined at the industry level.
The SIM measure of product similarity is the sum of the pairwise similarity
scores between a firm and all other firms on Compustat with EDGAR data
(above a certain similarity threshold), where a pairwise similarity score is
based on the number of similar words in the product description section of
the 10-K, and ranges from zero to one.
Panel A of table 2 gives the value of each alternative competition mea-
sure sorted by quintiles of PCTCOMP , along with t-statistics for the dif-
ference in means between the top and bottom quintile. Panel B gives the
Pearson and Spearman correlations. As table 2 shows, PCTCOMP is weakly
related to most of the other proxies for competitive intensity, including
the Hoberg-Phillips measure of product similarity. Two measures have the
wrong sign, IND-R&D and IND-MKTS, although the Spearman correlation
between IND-MKTS and PCTCOMP is insignificantly positive. Of particu-
lar note, based on the t-statistic size in panel A, are IND-PPE , IND-R&D,
IND-NUM , and SIM .
Firms in industries with larger PP&E levels reference competition in their
10-K significantly less than firms in industries with smaller PP&E levels, con-
sistent with the idea that the required investment in these industries creates
barriers to entry, and so competitors pose a less significant threat to them.
Firms in industries with more member firms (IND-NUM) or that have a
high number of competitors with similar products (SIM) reference compe-
tition more frequently, consistent with the idea that they experience more
competition from existing rivals and, hence, reference competition more
frequently. All three effects are economically significant; firms in the low-
est quintile of PCTCOMP have 29% more PPE , 29% fewer firms in their
industry, and 21% lower similarity score than firms in the highest quintile
of PCTCOMP .
The variable that appears the most anomalous in table 2 is IND-R&D,
which is increasing with PCTCOMP when the prediction is that it should
be decreasing. The argument, based on a resource model of competition
given in Barney [1986] or Peteraf [1993], is that firms create barriers to en-
try with R&D expenditures, and yet we find that the firms with the largest
R&D expenditures discuss competition the most in their 10-K. However,
Brown and Kimbrough [2011] argue and find empirical support for the
idea that R&D expenditures only create barriers to entry when they are
associated with a recognized intangible asset, such as a patent, copyright,
or other legal contract. Similarly, Ellis, Fee, and Thomas [2012] find that
firms with greater R&D expenditures are less likely to specifically list large
customers by name in their 10-K. Finally, R&D expenditures may represent
“Red Queen” competition, and the management’s discussion is in response
to the need to make continuous innovations in response to rivals’ innova-
tions (as the example of Open Text Corp. in appendix A illustrated).
A MEASURE OF COMPETITION BASED ON 10-K FILINGS 415
In sum, PCTCOMP appears to be a valid measure of competition insofar
as it is correlated with other well-known measures, but the relatively low
correlations imply that the PCTCOMP has substantial unique variation. It is
also weakly related to the amount of product market similarity a firm has
with other firms, but clearly measures something quite different. Moreover,
we show in the next section that our measure is significant in the presence
of these other measures, implying that it is not simply a noisy version of
another construct.
3.3 OTHER VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The remaining variable definitions follow the definitions used in the
prior literature (the Xpressfeed codes are italicized in parentheses—see
appendix B for additional description of the variable definitions). Finan-
cial statement variables without a time subscript are measured as of the end
of the current fiscal year t. RNOA is defined as operating income after de-
preciation (oiadp) divided by the average NOA, where NOA is defined as
net accounts receivable (rect) + inventories (invt) + all other current assets
(aco) + net property, plant and equipment (ppent) + intangibles (intan) +
all other assets (ao) – accounts payable (ap) – all other current liabilities
(lco) – all other liabilities (lo). This construction of NOA follows Fairfield,
Whisenant, and Yohn [2003]. Our object of prediction is the one-year-
ahead change in RNOA, denoted as D RNOAt+1.
We focus on RNOA rather than ROA because diminishing returns to in-
vestment apply primarily to operating assets.18 Consistent with this, in unt-
abulated tests we find similar but weaker evidence based on the ROA, de-
fined as operating income after depreciation divided by average total assets
(at).
Other financial variables used as descriptive measures, or as controls in
various regressions, are as follows.MV is calculated as the natural log of the
MV of equity at the end of the fiscal year (price [prc] × shares outstanding
[shrout]). Sales growth is defined as the year-over-year percentage change
in sales (sales).
Table 3 gives descriptive statistics for the variables in the study. RNOA
has a median of 0.12, consistent with prior studies. Next year’s change,
D RNOAt+1, has a small negative mean and a median value of zero. This
is the benchmark prediction our model will try to improve upon. The first
and third quartiles for RNOA are 0.04 and 0.22, respectively, so there is a
significant amount of variation available to explain. The change in NOA,
D NOA, is scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period. Although
the change in NOA is no longer a percent change, this is consistent with
18 Financial assets and liabilities may exhibit diminishing returns for sufficiently large
changes. However, the rate of return on investments in financial assets does not generally vary
with the size of the investment until the investment is completely owned and the next best
financial investment is made. Similarly, the rate of interest charged on a financial obligation
does not vary within a debt issue, but may increase when a new issue is made.
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TA B L E 3
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean p25 Median p75 SD n
PCTCOMP 0.58 0.23 0.44 0.78 0.49 33,379
COMP 0.50 0.22 0.44 0.78 0.32 33,379
D NOA 0.07 −0.03 0.04 0.13 0.20 33,379
RNOA 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.22 0.25 33,379
D RNOAt+1 −0.01 −0.06 0.00 0.04 0.17 33,379
MV 5.70 4.20 5.64 7.08 2.08 33,379
TOTAL ASSETS 2,199 83 304 1,288 5,844 33,379
SGROWTH 0.18 −0.01 0.09 0.24 0.53 33,379
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in this paper. Observations with RNOA>
1; RNOA < −1; MV < 0 (i.e., market value of equity <$1 million); SGROWTH < −1; or SGROWTH > 10
have been eliminated. All other variables, except PCTCOMP , COMP , fCOMP , iCOMP , and MV , have been
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. See appendix B for variable definitions.
TA B L E 4
Pearson Correlations
n = 33,379 COMP D NOA RNOA D RNOAt+1 MV TOTAL ASSETS
D NOA −0.01
RNOA −0.04 0.17
D RNOAt+1 −0.03 −0.17 −0.37
MV −0.15 0.13 0.32 −0.02
TOTAL ASSETS −0.15 −0.01 0.08 0.02 0.60
SGROWTH 0.02 0.43 0.05 −0.08 0.06 −0.03
This table presents pairwise Pearson correlations between the variables of interest in this study. All
boldfaced correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% level or higher. See appendix B for variable
definitions.
the definition in Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn [2003] and Richardson
et al. [2005]. Because NOA can be very small, scaling by total assets keeps
the variable from becoming too extreme. The change in NOA is 0.04 at the
median indicating the median firm is modestly growing.
Table 4 gives the Pearson correlations between the main variables in the
study. In terms of our variable of interest, COMP (the decile-ranked value
of PCTCOMP), the most extreme correlation is with size, measured either
as total assets or MV ; bigger firms report relatively less competition than
smaller firms. In terms of D RNOAt+1, the two main effects of diminishing
marginal returns are present; the future change in RNOA has a negative
correlation with the current period’s level (RNOA) and a negative correla-
tion with the current period’s change in operating assets (D NOA). Further,
the economic magnitude of the relation between D RNOAt+1 and firm size,
as measured byMV or total assets, is immaterial.
3.4 THE INFLUENCE OF REPORTED COMPETITION ON FUTURE
PERFORMANCE
To assess the impact of reported competition on the rate of diminish-
ing returns on current and new investments, we estimate variations on the
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following two regressions:
D RNOAi,t+1=βt It+β1∗RNOAi,t+β2∗D NOAi,t+ei,t+1 (1)
and
D RNOAi,t+1 = βt It+β1∗RNOAi,t+β2∗D NOAi,t+β3∗COMPi,t
+β4∗RNOAi,t∗COMPi,t+β5∗D NOAi,t∗COMPi,t+ei,t+1.
(2)
The first regression gives the estimated diminishing marginal return re-
lations before any consideration of reported competition and the second
regression fully interacts all the variables in the first regression with COMP
(recall that COMP is scaled such that it is zero in the lowest decile and one
in the highest decile). In equation (1), β1 measures the rate of mean re-
version in RNOA controlling for any change in NOA; as such, it measures
the diminishing marginal rate of return on existing assets. Controlling for
the mean reversion in RNOA, the coefficient β2 estimates the diminishing
marginal rate of return on changes in NOA. Both β1 and β2 are hypothe-
sized to be negative. In equation (2), these effects are conditioned on the
level of COMP , as measured by the coefficients β4 and β5, both of which
are hypothesized to be negative. Both regressions have year fixed effects,
denoted by β t I t (in the tables we report only the average of the yearly
fixed effects). We include year fixed effects to control for a common pe-
riod effect across all firms in a year. In addition, all t-statistics are computed
with standard errors clustered at the industry level to control for unspec-
ified correlation between observations for the same industry in different
years.19
Consistent with prior research (Fairfield and Yohn [2001], Soliman
[2008], Curtis and Lewis [2010]), the sample for the diminishing marginal
return regressions in table 5 is limited to firms with positive operating in-
come (reducing the sample to 26,823 observations). Although RNOAmean
reverts for a loss firm, the rate of mean reversion is likely not the same as
the rate for profit firms (Fama and French [2000]); the earnings of loss
firms are more transitory than the earnings of gain firms (Li [2011]). Fur-
ther, the rate of mean reversion toward profit is not necessarily increasing
in competition, which is what equation (2) would predict for loss firms.
Nevertheless, for completeness, in table 6 we give the results with loss firms
included.
19 In our setting, we expect that the correlations within industries are more significant
than cross-sectional correlations. We follow Petersen [2009], who argues that panel regres-
sions with appropriate fixed effects and clustered standard errors are more general than a
Fama–MacBeth approach. Specifically, we include time-fixed effects in the regressions to con-
trol for the nonstochastic component of the cross-sectional effects, and calculate and report
standard errors clustered at the industry-level; when we do not include the year-fixed effects,
our results are calculated using two-way clustering on industry and year, which accounts for
both cross-sectional and temporal dependence.
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TA B L E 5
Pooled Regressions of Changes in Return on Net Operating Assets and Competition
Dependent Variable: D RNOAt+1
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
−0.112∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
D NOA [−16.59] [−9.19] [−8.53]
RNOA −0.244∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗
[−14.60] [−11.25] [−7.94]
ATO −0.010∗∗∗
[−6.44]
PM −0.169∗∗∗
[−9.69]
COMP −0.002 −0.001 0.011
[−0.39] [−0.16] [1.21]
COMP ∗ D NOA −0.058∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗
[−3.46] [−2.31] [−4.61]
COMP ∗ RNOA −0.086∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗
[−2.99] [−2.26]
COMP ∗ ATO −0.009∗∗∗
[−2.81]
COMP ∗ PM −0.136∗∗∗
[−2.68]
Avg. Year FE/Intercept 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
Year FE? Y Y N Y
SE clustered by industry? Y Y Y Y
SE clustered by year? N N Y N
Adj. R2 0.169 0.173 0.113 0.141
N 26,823 26,823 26,823 26,823
This table presents the results of a pooled OLS regression of future changes in RNOA on (1) contem-
poraneous D NOA and RNOA with year fixed effects, (2) including COMP and interactions, (3) including
COMP and interactions without year fixed effects but with standard errors clustered at the industry and year
level, and (4) D NOA and components of RNOA (ATO and PM). Firms with negative RNOA in year t have
been deleted for this analysis. See appendix B for variable definitions. Models with year fixed effects report
the average of the intercept coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the industry (four-digit SIC) level
when year fixed effects are included and are clustered at both the industry and year levels when year fixed
effects are not included in column (3); t-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The first column in table 5 shows significant diminishing marginal re-
turns. The coefficient of –0.112 on D NOA means RNOA is estimated to
decrease next year by over 10% of the increase in NOA, all else equal. The
mean reversion coefficient of –0.244 on RNOA implies that RNOA next year
is estimated to decrease by almost a quarter of the current year’s RNOA.
These coefficient estimates are consistent with prior studies. Column 2 in
table 5 reports the model when our measure of competition is interacted
with all the variables in column 1. The significant negative coefficients on
COMP∗D NOA and COMP∗RNOA show that competition accelerates the
rate of diminishing returns on new investments and existing assets, respec-
tively. And the economic magnitude is impressive. The mean reversion co-
efficient on RNOA is –0.192 when competition is in the lowest decile and
is –0.192 to 0.086 = –0.278 when competition is in the highest decile. Simi-
larly, the coefficient on D NOA is –0.086 when competition is in the lowest
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TA B L E 6
Using Industry-Adjusted Return on Net Operating Assets
Dependent Variable: ADJ D RNOAt+1
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables All Firms Above Industry Mean Below Industry Mean
D NOA −0.074∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
[−7.97] [−7.83] [−3.49]
ADJ RNOA −0.217∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗
[−12.27] [−10.14] [−3.94]
COMP −0.007∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
[−2.02] [−0.12] [−0.10]
COMP ∗ D NOA −0.060∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗ −0.048∗∗
[−3.36] [−2.49] [−2.18]
COMP ∗ ADJ RNOA −0.114∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ 0.158
[−3.09] [−2.61] [1.33]
Avg. Year FE/Intercept 0.005∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ −0.002
Year FE? Y Y Y
SE clustered by industry? Y Y Y
Adj. R2 0.153 0.192 0.016
N 26,823 17,841 8,982
This table presents the results of a pooled OLS regression of future changes in industry-adjusted RNOA
on D NOA and industry-adjusted RNOA and interactions with COMP . Column (1) includes all firms, column
(2) includes only those firms above the industry mean, and column (3) includes only those firms below the
industry mean. Firms with negative RNOA in year t have been deleted for this analysis. See appendix B for
variable definitions. Models with year fixed effects report the average of the intercept coefficients. Standard
errors are clustered at the industry (four-digit SIC) level; t-statistics are reported in brackets below the
coefficient estimates. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
decile and –0.086 to 0.058 = –0.144 when competition is in the highest
decile.20 As an alternative specification of the error structure, the regres-
sion reported in column 3 includes a single intercept rather than yearly
fixed effects, and clusters standard errors at both the year and industry
levels. The results for all variables are very similar to those reported in
column 2.
The last column in table 5 replaces the current period RNOA with net
operating margin (PM) and net operating asset turnover (ATO). This is
exploratory because we do not have a hypothesis for why reported com-
petition might affect margins or turnovers differently. For a given level of
operating assets, competition could reduce sales, and hence ATO, and for a
given level of sales, competition could reduce profit, and hence PM . What
we see in the third column of table 5 is that both effects are significant.
Further, the expected impact on the dependent variable is similar for the
two components of RNOA. Multiplying the coefficient on PM∗COMP with
the median value of PM (0.094) results in a –0.013 incremental effect and
20 The adjusted R2 has a small increase from column (1) (16.9%) to column (2) (17.3%).
We do not expect a substantially higher R2 here because the dependent variable (future
change in ROA) is time-varying and our key independent variable is an interaction of cur-
rent ROA and investment and a relatively persistent variable (competition). Given this, our
focus is not on the increase in R2, but on the economic magnitude of the interaction term.
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FIG. 2.—(A) Coefficient β1 by PCTCOMP Quintile in: D RNOAt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗RNOA +
β2 ∗D NOA. (B) Coefficient β2 by PCTCOMP Quintile in: D RNOAt+1 = β0 + β1 ∗RNOA +
β2 ∗D NOA.
multiplying the coefficient on ATO∗COMP with the median value of ATO
(1.786) results in a –0.016 incremental effect.
To illustrate the effect of competition on the return on existing assets
and new investments, figures 2(A) and (B) graph the estimated coefficients
from equation (1) within each quintile of PCTCOMP . As both figures show,
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as our measure of competition increases, the rates of diminishing returns
become more negative. The biggest effect on the rate of mean reversion
in RNOA comes in quintiles three and four of PCTCOMP , although the
biggest effect on the rate of diminishing returns on new investment comes
in quintiles two and three.
Table 6 presents the first of many specification checks. In this table we
create the variables ADJ D RNOA and ADJ RNOA by subtracting the indus-
try mean from the current and future RNOA (using the Fama-French in-
dustry definitions).21 The idea is that RNOA is more likely to mean-revert
toward an industry average than toward zero (as table 5 implicitly assumes).
The downside to this specification is that it requires an industry defini-
tion. As seen in column 1, the coefficients on the interactions with COMP
remain significant and are actually slightly more negative than those re-
ported in table 5. To examine this further, we divide the sample between
firms whose current RNOA is above industry mean or below the industry
mean (where the industry mean is computed before the loss firms are
eliminated). Comparing columns 2 and 3, we see that the coefficients on
COMP∗D NOA are relatively similar across the two samples, but the coeffi-
cients on COMP∗ADJ RNOA are very different. Consistent with the hypoth-
esis that competition accelerates the mean reversion of abnormally high
RNOA but impedes the mean reversion from below themean, we find oppo-
site signs on the COMP∗ADJ RNOA coefficients. However, only the negative
coefficient for firms above the mean is statistically significant.
Table 7 presents nine additional robustness tests. In column 1 we force
the competition measure to capture only variation unrelated to the size of
the firm. To construct this measure we create deciles of PCTCOMP within-
size quintiles, where size is measured as total assets. The concern is that
the weak negative correlation between PCTCOMP and size is causing PCT-
COMP to proxy for an underlying size effect. Of course, bigger firms could
legitimately face less competition, so this version of our measure might well
throw out legitimate variation. The results in column 1 are weaker than the
results in table 5 but the coefficients on COMP∗D NOA and COMP∗RNOA
are still significant.22 In the next two models we explore size as it impacts
the scale of our measure.
For the main tests we scale PCTCOMP by the total number of words in
the 10-K and then sort into deciles to construct COMP . To rule out the pos-
sibility that the scalar is somehow impacting our results, we use total assets
and the number of business segments as two alternative scalars. We use total
assets because it is the most common measure of the scale and scope of a
firm’s operations, and we use the number of segments because the MD&A
section of the 10-K specifically requires a discussion by business segment.
21 Similar inferences are obtained using four-digit SIC definitions of industry.
22 In untabulated results, we also include firm size and industry-fixed effects in the regres-
sion and our results are very similar.
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The results are shown in columns 2 and 3 in table 7. Both models yield sim-
ilar results. When COMP is constructed using either scalar, the coefficient
on COMP∗D NOA is slightly smaller than in table 5, although still signifi-
cant, and the coefficient on COMP∗RNOA is considerably larger, and con-
siderably more significant. We believe that scaling by the number of words
in the document is the most natural way to identify management’s concern
about competition, but alternative scalars yield even stronger results.
As was seen in figure 1, our COMP measure is very persistent through
time. If COMP is a noisy measure of “true” competition, and if “true” com-
petition is also very persistent through time, then averaging our measure
over many prior periods should average out some of the noise and result in
a better measure of “true” competition. In column 4 of table 7, we report
the results when COMP is averaged over up to 10 prior years (i.e., years t−9
to t). The results are consistent with a reduction in noise in that both mean
reversion coefficients increase relative to the results in table 5.
The model in column 5 of table 7 includes the current year change in
RNOA (D RNOA) in the regression to account for any correlation between
contemporaneous performance and management’s discussion of competi-
tion. If, for example, management tends to blame a decline in performance
on competition and this decline persists, then our competition measure
may simply be picking up information that is already included in the fi-
nancial results. The results in column 5 indicate that, although changes in
performance persist (i.e., the coefficient on D RNOA is significantly posi-
tive, consistent with Fairfield and Yohn [2001]), this has little effect on the
magnitude of the coefficients on COMP∗RNOA and COMP∗D NOA.
Columns 6, 7, and 8 of table 7 explore the impact of nonlinearities on our
main results. Prior studies find that mean reversion occurs more severely
for extreme performance firms. In column 6 we exclude firms with current
RNOAmore than two standard deviations above the mean to see if COMP is
simply identifying these extreme observations. The results show that both
interactions with COMP remain significant, and the coefficients are only
slightly smaller than those reported in column 2 of table 5. In column 7
we exclude observations in the bottom decile of PCTCOMP (COMP = 0).
Here the concern is that firms with extremely high competition may not
discuss it in their 10-K because everybody already knows that this is the case;
consequently, they will wrongly measure as having low levels of competition.
The results in column 7 are very similar to the results in table 5 column
2. The coefficient on COMP∗D NOA is slightly smaller but the coefficient
on COMP∗RNOA is slightly bigger. In column 8 we explore the opposite
possibility that the effect is primarily driven by a few firms, which discuss
competition extensively. We remove those observations in the most extreme
top decile of PCTCOMP (COMP = 1) and again find similar results. It thus
appears that the nonlinear aspects of the data are not driving the results.
Finally, in column 9 of table 7 we estimate equation (2) on the full sam-
ple that includes loss firms (approximately 19% of the sample) with an
interacted dummy variable (LOSS) for loss firms that allows them to have
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different coefficients from profit firms. The very bottom of the table pro-
vides the coefficient estimates for the loss firms. The coefficient of the main
effect of diminishing marginal returns (β1 + β7) is significant and of com-
parable magnitude to the profit sample value (i.e., β7 is insignificant), but
the estimated coefficient of mean reversion (β2 + β8) is significantly larger
than for the profit sample. This is consistent with Fama and French [2000],
who find that mean reversion occurs much faster for poorly performing
firms. Moreover, we find that conditioning on the extent of competition
provides no incremental explanatory power for loss firms (i.e., β4 + β10
and β5 + β11 are insignificantly different from zero). This provides useful
confirmatory evidence of the suggestion in Brooks and Buckmaster [1976]
and Fama and French [2000] that accounting conservatism—rather than
competition per se—plays a significant role in the earnings mean reversion
of loss firms (i.e., earnings with significant write-downs in year t empirically
mean revert more quickly in t + 1).
In table 3 we validated our measure by showing that it was weakly corre-
lated with other accepted measures of competition. Table 8 shows that our
results are not due to an omitted-correlated variable problem where PCT-
COMP is only a proxy for one of these other effects. For each of the seven
alternative competition measures, and for the product similarity measure,
we estimate the following equation, where IND-COMP is replaced with the
particular alternative measure in question:
D RNOAi,t+1 = βt It+β1∗RNOAi,t+β2∗D NOAi,t+β3∗COMPi,t
+β4∗RNOAi,t∗COMPi,t+β5∗D NOAi,t∗COMPi,t
+β3∗IND COMPi,t+β4∗RNOAi,t∗IND COMPi,t
+β5∗D NOAi,t∗IND COMPi,t+ei,t+1. (3)
If our measure COMP is simply a noisy proxy for one of the IND-COMP
measures, then including them both in the same regression will cause
COMP ’s interactions with RNOA and D NOA to become insignificant. To
make the alternative measures comparable to COMP , we sorted each into
deciles, and then scaled them to be between zero and one. Theoretically,
competition is decreasing in the first six measures, so the sign on the in-
teraction should be positive (thus making the sum of coefficients less neg-
ative), and is increasing in IND-NUM and SIM , so the sign on these inter-
actions should be negative. Table 8 gives the results. Looking across the
row for COMP∗RNOA and COMP∗D NOA shows that all the interactions re-
main significant in the presence of all eight alternative proxies for competi-
tion.23 Further, the coefficient magnitudes generally remain comparable to
the levels in table 5. The coefficients on the first four IND-COMP variables
23 In untabulated results we also examined two other competition measures from Li [2010],
the industry ROA and the industry profit level. Our COMP interactions are virtually un-
changed. We also construct industry concentration measures based on the Global Industry
Classification Standard (GICS)—a classification scheme that may better explain stock return
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are sometimes significant but all have the wrong sign when interacted with
RNOA. Including IND-R&D has the largest impact on our coefficients of
interest, although the signs on the interactions with IND-R&D are positive,
which is inconsistent with the theory that R&D intensity reduces competi-
tion.
In contrast to the first four columns of table 8, columns 5 through 8
show that the two concentration ratios, the number of firms in the indus-
try, and the Hoberg-Phillips product similarity measure all have significant
interactions with RNOA (and in the predicted direction). The continued
significance of the interactions between COMP and D NOA and RNOA in-
dicates that our measure is a useful complement to certain industry-based
measures of competition. For instance, the difference in the rate of mean
reversion in RNOA between the top and bottom deciles of COMP is –0.068
as seen in column 6; if we also take the difference between the top and bot-
tom deciles of IND-HHI this increases threefold to –0.068 to 0.112 = –0.180
(recall that higher levels of HHI indicate lower levels of competition).
We have emphasized that COMP does not require a definition of indus-
try boundaries. Nonetheless, any discussion of competition begs the ques-
tion “competition with whom?” and industries are a natural way to think
about the set of relevant firms. For this reason, we examine an industry-
level version of our measure. In particular, we create the variable iCOMP by
averaging PCTCOMP over the firm’s industry each year (excluding the firm
itself), forming deciles, and then scaling the ranks to be between zero and
one. We use four different industry definitions; the Fama-French 48 indus-
tries, which average 162 firms per industry; the SIC3 and SIC4 definitions,
which average 62 and 21 firms per industry, respectively; and the Hoberg-
Phillips Text-Based Network Industry Classification (TNIC) metric, which
averages 43.9 firms per industry.24 Recall that the first three definitions
have relatively little temporal variation and create mutually exclusive sets
of industries although the Hoberg-Phillips measure is dynamic and does
not impose exclusivity on the sets of industries.
Table 9 gives the results for regressions that add iCOMP and interactions
with D NOA and RNOA to equation (2).25 Beginning with the Fama-French
industry definition in column 1, we see that both the interactions with
COMP and the interactions with iCOMP are significant. For D NOA, the
interaction with COMP has a coefficient of –0.045 and the interaction with
co-movements (see Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler [2003])—and find that our results are virtually
identical.
24 The Hoberg-Phillips text-based industries were developed to have a distribution similar
to that of SIC3 in terms of number of firms. We note that the medians for SIC3 and Hoberg-
Phillips TNIC are very similar. Moreover, the mean number of firms we report in table 9 are
only for the subsample of firms that we analyze, not the full sample.
25 In previous versions of the paper, we also report the results of a purely “within-” industry
constructed version of COMP , wherein PCTCOMP was ranked within industry-year (rather
than just year). The results of this variable are very similar to those of COMP reported in table
9 in which COMP is conditioned on iCOMP in the regression.
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TA B L E 9
Examining Within and Between Industry Competition
Dependent Variable: D RNOAt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variables FF 48 SIC-3 SIC-4 H-P TNIC
D NOA −0.069∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗
[−4.93] [−4.35] [−4.62] [−4.22]
RNOA −0.145∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗
[−6.18] [−5.88] [−5.97] [−5.25]
COMP −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.008
[−0.77] [−0.60] [−0.84] [−1.54]
COMP ∗ D NOA −0.045∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.037∗∗ −0.027
[−2.73] [−2.16] [−2.14] [−1.52]
COMP ∗ RNOA −0.060∗∗ −0.063∗∗ −0.050∗ −0.013
[−2.07] [−2.16] [−1.72] [−0.47]
iCOMP 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.009
[0.79] [0.71] [0.88] [1.41]
iCOMP ∗ D NOA −0.048∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗
[−2.18] [−2.74] [−2.43] [−3.29]
iCOMP ∗ RNOA −0.101∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗
[−2.60] [−2.49] [−3.16] [−4.60]
Avg. Year FE/Intercept 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
Year FE? Y Y Y Y
SE clustered by industry? Y Y Y Y
Adj. R2 0.176 0.177 0.181 0.185
N 26,823 26,102 24,001 23,001
Mean firms per industry 162.0 62.0 21.0 43.9
Mean coefficient of
variation of PCTCOMP
within industry
0.70 0.67 0.66 0.66
This table presents the results of a pooled OLS regression of future changes in RNOA on firm level
variation (COMP) and industry level variation (iCOMP) in competition. iCOMP is calculated for firm i in
industry k by averaging PCTCOMP over all firms j in industry k in year t, where i = j (i.e., the firm’s own
PCTCOMP is excluded from the average). Consistent with the calculation of COMP , we create deciles of this
variable across all firms each year and transform the decile values between 0 and 1. Each column calculates
iCOMP based on different industry definitions as indicated by the column header. The sample size decreases
as the industry definition becomes more specific because an increasing number of industries include only
one firm and are eliminated from the sample. The decrease in sample size for HP-TNIC is mainly caused by
a loss of the first and last years of the sample in which these industry definitions are unavailable. Firms with
negative RNOA in year t have been deleted for this analysis. See appendix B for variable definitions. Models
with year fixed effects report the average of the intercept coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the
industry (four-digit SIC) level; t-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
iCOMP has a coefficient of –0.048. Both the firm- and industry-level com-
petition measures contribute to the description of diminishing returns on
new assets. Similarly, for RNOA the interaction with COMP has a coefficient
of –0.060 and the interaction with iCOMP has a coefficient of –0.101. Both
the firm- and industry-level measures contribute to the description of di-
minishing returns on existing assets. The results are similar for the SIC3
and SIC4 classifications, as seen in columns 2 and 3. The most interesting
results arise when we use the Hoberg-Phillips industry definitions. In col-
umn 4, the interactions with COMP are no longer significant although the
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interactions with iCOMP are significant and have notably larger coefficients
than those reported in columns 1, 2, and 3. For instance, the difference in
the rate of mean reversion in RNOA between the top and bottom deciles of
iCOMP is –0.176, almost three times larger than the original coefficient on
COMP∗RNOA reported in column 2 of table 5. These results suggest that,
as the industry classification scheme improves, the power of our compe-
tition measure to identify different levels of industry competitiveness also
improves.26
The results in table 9 also help mitigate the concern about an alterna-
tive explanation of our main results in the paper. One possible explana-
tion of our empirical findings is that our competition measure does not
really capture competition; rather, it captures managers’ blaming competi-
tion for their firms’ poor performance. Under this alternative explanation,
our measure reflects the excuses of managers for their poor performance,
rather than the true competition. To the extent that management’s incen-
tives to attribute poor performance to competition are firm specific, the
result in table 9 that the industry-average of our measure leads to stronger
results suggests that our empirical findings are not driven by this alternative
explanation.
Our final set of tests looks for any evidence of strategic manipulation of
the disclosures in the 10-K to influence rival firms. Our maintained assump-
tions are that managers have a reasonably accurate perception of the “true”
amount of competition they face, whatever its form, and that their disclo-
sures about competition in the 10-K filing are a reasonably accurate reflec-
tion of these perceptions. Absent an observable measure of “true” com-
petition, we cannot directly assess these maintained assumptions, so any
evidence we offer is necessarily circumstantial. Our approach is to identify
firms that, based on other measures of competition, might face the greatest
incentives to distort their disclosures about competition, or simply have an
inaccurate perception of their competitive threats, and then compare these
with firms who face the least incentives to distort their disclosures.
Li [2010] studies how competition influences a firm’s likelihood of pro-
viding earnings or capital expenditure guidance to analysts, finding that
firms in industries facing a high threat of entry or a low level of rivalry
among existing firms disclose less than firms in industries facing a low
threat of entry or high rivalry among existing firms. For our first set of tests
we hypothesize that this same distinction will influence how truthfully firms
talk about competition in their 10-K filing. To identify the type of competi-
tive threat faced by the firm, we use the industry competition variables from
Li [2010] discussed in tables 2 and 8.
26 In untabulated results we also add interactions between the Herfindahl index (HHI) and
D NOA and RNOA to the regression shown in column 4 of table 9. Unlike the results in table
8 column 6, the interactions with the Herfindahl index are no longer significant (i.e., when
industries are defined using Hoberg-Phillips, and competition is measured at the industry
level using iCOMP , the Herfindahl index is no longer significant).
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Li [2010] uses the first four variables (IND-PPE , IND-R&D, IND-CAPX ,
and IND-MKTS) as proxies for the threat of potential entry by new rivals
and uses the next three (IND-CON4, IND-HHI , and IND-NUM) as proxies
for the threat from existing rivals. To mitigate the noise in any one of the
variables relative to its underlying construct, we create two new variables,
POTENTIAL and EXISTING , by averaging over the decile ranks of each of
the variables within the particular competition construct. We then identify
two sets of firms. The firms in the first set have low levels of POTENTIAL
and high levels of EXISTING , and are hypothesized to have little reason to
distort their disclosures about competition. These firms already face stiff
competition from existing firms and do not fear entry from new firms. The
firms in the second set have high levels of POTENTIAL and low levels of EX-
ISTING , and are hypothesized to have the greatest reason to distort their
disclosures about competition. These firms want to deter entry from new
firms and keep existing rivals from altering their behavior. We use the me-
dian of POTENTIAL and EXISTING to identify high and low values of each
construct.
The results from estimating equation (2) on the two sets of firms are
given in columns 1 and 2 in table 10. Both models show diminishing re-
turns on new and existing investments, as seen by the significantly neg-
ative coefficients on D NOA and RNOA. However, the amount that our
measure of competition conditions these rates is considerably greater for
the first set of firms (who have less incentive to distort disclosures) than
for the second set of firms (who have more incentive to distort disclo-
sures). The coefficient on COMP∗D NOA is –0.084 in the first model
and –0.052 in the second model; both are significant. The coefficient on
COMP∗RNOA is –0.101 in the first model and only –0.014 in the second
model, and this last value is insignificant. Although the evidence is indi-
rect, the lower coefficients on the interactions with COMP in the second
model are what we would expect if the COMP measure is being distorted by
firms in industries with a high threat of entry and low rivalry among existing
firms.
For our second set of tests we perform the same exercise using the
Hoberg-Phillips SIM variable to separate firms into two groups (using the
sample median SIM score to divide firms into groups of high- and low-
product similarity). The idea here is that variation in management’s dis-
cussion of competition is more meaningful for firms who face many rivals
with similar products because such firms have a clearer view of competi-
tive threats. The rival firms and rival products already exist, and they are
either successfully or unsuccessfully competing with these rivals. On the
other hand, a firm with a low SIM score may have a harder time assess-
ing the competitive landscape and so variation in COMP for these firms
is less accurate. The results in columns 3 and 4 support this hypothesis.
The coefficients on the interaction terms COMP∗D NOA and COMP∗RNOA
are –0.080 and –0.087, respectively, when the SIM score is above the me-
dian and only –0.039 and –0.023, respectively, when the SIM score is below
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TA B L E 1 0
Interaction with Other Competition Measures
Dependent Variable: D RNOAt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Potential High Potential High Low
Entrant Threat Entrant Threat Product Product
and High and Low Similarity Similarity
Independent Variables Existing Rivalry Existing Rivalry
D NOA −0.090∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
[−4.33] [−7.26] [−5.00] [−7.70]
RNOA −0.219∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗
[−7.57] [−6.99] [−7.83] [−7.77]
COMP 0.002 −0.001 −0.007 −0.006
[0.30] [−0.20] [−0.94] [−0.79]
COMP ∗ D NOA −0.081∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.037
[−2.29] [−2.30] [−2.99] [−1.59]
COMP ∗ RNOA −0.103∗∗ −0.021 −0.087∗∗ −0.025
[−2.53] [−0.55] [−2.26] [−0.59]
Avg. Year FE 0.024∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
Year FE? Y Y Y Y
SE clustered by industry? Y Y Y Y
Adj. R2 0.213 0.133 0.190 0.165
N 8,882 9,930 11,098 12,484
This table presents the main results from table 5 after conditioning on the type and level of industry
competition and the extent of competition based on product similarity. For industry competition, we iden-
tify firms in industries with a low threat of potential entry and a high level of existing rivalry (column 1)
and firms in industries with a high threat of potential entry and a low level of existing rivalry (column 2).
We average across the deciles of the industry measures IND-PPE , IND-R&D, IND-CAPX , and IND-MKTS as
a proxy for the threat of entry and IND-CON4, IND-HHI , and IND-NUM as a proxy for the level of existing
rivalry. If a firm is below the median for the potential threat proxy and above the median for the existing
rivalry, the firm-year will be included in column 1. Likewise, if a firm is above the median for the potential
threat proxy and below the median for the existing rivalry, the firm-year will be included in column 2. The
sample size does not equal that of table 5 because some firms are in the high/high and low/low categories.
In columns (3) and (4) we portion the sample based on the Hoberg and Phillips [2011] total product sim-
ilarity measure (TNIC3TSIMM—see table 3 for details). After identifying the separate subsamples for each
of the columns, we repeat the regression from column 2 of table 5. See appendix B for variable definitions.
Models with year fixed effects report the average of the intercept coefficients. Standard errors are clustered
at the industry (four-digit SIC) level; t-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. ∗,
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
the median.27 We believe that the results in table 10 not only help us un-
derstand the strategic disclosure aspects of our proposed measure, but also
reinforce the complementarity of our disclosure-based variable with tradi-
tional industry measures of competition.
27 To examine the complementarity of competitors’ reported competition with a firm’s own
report of competition, we also partition the sample based on the level of iCOMP (using the
Hoberg-Phillips TNIC definition). In untabulated results, we find that the COMP interactions
with D NOA and RNOA are more negative in the high iCOMP partition compared to the low
iCOMP partition (where neither coefficient is significant). This result reinforces the comple-
mentarity notion of considering both the firm and its competitors.
432 F. LI, R. LUNDHOLM, AND M. MINNIS
4. Conclusion
By simply counting the number of times a firm refers to competition
in its regulatory 10-K, we measure a firm’s competitive environment in a
simple yet novel way. We show that this measure is only weakly related to
industry concentration and other existing measures of competition, and
can be used as a stand-alone measure of competition or to construct an
industry-level measure. Further, our results show that the measure behaves
as if it is measuring “true” competition, in that higher levels correspond
to greater rates of mean reversion on the firm’s RNOA and greater rates
of diminishing returns to new investment. Conditioning a forecast of next
year’s RNOA by the level of competition results in a significant and econom-
ically meaningful difference between firms with high versus low levels of
competition. These results suggest that the disclosures management makes
in the 10-K filing about competition are useful for financial statement
analysis.
APPENDIX A
Competition References
1) “The markets for sportswear, outerwear, footwear, and related acces-
sories and equipment are highly competitive. In each of our geo-
graphic markets, we face significant competition from numerous and
varying competitors. Some of our large wholesale customers also pose
a significant competitive threat by marketing apparel, footwear and
equipment under their own private labels.” Columbia Sportswear Co.,
2-27-2009.
2) “We compete for investment opportunities with entities that have sub-
stantially greater financial resources than we do. These entities gener-
ally may be able to accept more risk than we can prudently manage.
This competition may generally limit the number of suitable invest-
ment opportunities offered to us. This competition may also increase
the bargaining power of property owners seeking to sell to us, making
it more difficult for us to acquire new properties on attractive terms.”
MHI Hospitality Corp, 3-25-2009.
3) “Our future success will also depend on our ability to attract and re-
tain key managers, designers, sales people and others. We face intense
competition for these individuals worldwide, and there is a significant
concentration of well-funded apparel and footwear competitors in
and around Portland, Oregon.” Columbia Sportswear Co. 2-27-2009.
4) “The markets for our products are intensely competitive, and are sub-
ject to rapid technological change and other pressures created by
changes in our industry. We expect competition to increase and inten-
sify in the future as the pace of technological change and adaptation
quickens and as additional companies enter into each of our markets.
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Numerous releases of competitive products have occurred in recent
history and may be expected to continue in the near future.” Open
Text Corp, 8-26-2008.
5) “We believe that there is currently no or limited competition in the
markets we plan to pursue, and there is an increasing demand due
to the rising levels of installed wind energy capacity worldwide.” First
National Energy Corp, 1-4-2011.
6) “Our ability to acquire additional reserves in the future could be lim-
ited by competition from other companies for attractive properties.”
Oil Dri Corp, 10–12-2010.
A P P E N D I X B
Variable Definitions
Variable Description
NWORDS The total number of words in the 10-K.
NCOMP The number of times “competition, competitor, competitive, compete,
competing,” occurs in the 10-K, including those words with an “s”
appended. Cases where “not,” “less,” “few,” or “limited” precedes the word
by three or fewer words were removed.
PCTCOMP Number of occurrences of competition-related words (NCOMP) per 1,000
total words in the 10-K (NWORDS). In table 2 only, we de-trended this
variable by subtracting the mean for all firms in year t from firm i’s
PCTCOMP value (creating variable PCTCOMP DETREND).
COMP A transformation of PCTCOMP , scaled between 0 and 1, calculated by
forming decile rank portfolios of PCTCOMP each year, subtracting 1 from
the decile rank and dividing by 9.
RET The 12-month buy and hold return calculated by compounding the 12
monthly returns beginning the first month after the 10-K filing date and
adjusting the return by subtracting the corresponding 12-month buy and
hold return from the same NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ decile size portfolio.
RNOA Return on net operating assets calculated by dividing operating income after
depreciation (oiadpi,t) by the average net operating assets ((NOAi,t +
NOAi,t−1)/2). D RNOAt+1 is the change in this variable from year t to year t
+ 1.
NOA Net operating assets calculated as net accounts receivable (rect) + inventories
(invt) + all other current assets (aco) + net property, plant and equipment
(ppent) + intangibles (intan) + all other assets (ao) – accounts payable (ap)
– all other current liabilities (lco) – all other liabilities (lo). D NOA is the
change in this variable from year t – 1 to year t scaled by average total assets.
ROA Return on assets calculated by dividing operating income after depreciation
(oiadpi,t) by the average total assets ((ati,t−1 + ati,t)/2).
TA Total assets (ati,t). D TA is the change in this variable from year t – 1 to year t
scaled by the average total assets.
MV MV $ is market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year (price (prc) ×
shares outstanding (shrout)).MV is the natural log ofMV $. Firms with
market values less than $1 million have been deleted.
SGROWTH Year-over-year percentage change in sales calculated as (Salei,t –
Salei,t−1)/Salei,t−1.
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